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The global health law trilogy: towards a safer, healthier, 
and fairer world
Lawrence O Gostin, Mary Clare DeBartolo, Rebecca Katz
Global health advocates often turn to medicine and science for solutions to enduring health risks, but law is also a 
powerful tool. No state acting alone can ward off health threats that span borders, requiring international solutions. 
A trilogy of global health law—the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, International Health Regulations 
(2005), and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework—strives for a safer, healthier, and fairer world. Yet, these 
international agreements are not well understood, and contain gaps in scope and enforceability. Moreover, major 
health concerns remain largely unregulated at the international level, such as non-communicable diseases, mental 
health, and injuries. Here, we offer reforms for this global health law trilogy. 
Introduction
The Lancet-O’Neill Institute, Georgetown University 
Commission on Global Health and the Law aims to 
demonstrate the power of law to achieve global health 
with justice. Here, as a prelude to the Commission’s full 
report, we examine and offer reforms for this global 
health law trilogy. New governance strategies would 
assure the instruments’ success, providing an essential 
roadmap for the new WHO Director-General.1
The WHO Constitution grants the organisation 
extensive normative authority (panel 1).2 Although WHO 
principally exercises normative authority through soft 
law (codes of practice, action plans, and 
recommendations), the organisation oversees three 
major international legal instruments: The Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), International 
Health Regulations (IHR), and the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) Frame work. Each instrument is 
grounded in a different constitutional function: Article 19 
(Conventions), Article 21 (Regulations), and Article 23 
(Recommendations). These agreements provide models 
for global health diplomacy, advancing WHO’s historic 
normative mission (figure).2 As international treaties, the 
FCTC and IHR are legally binding. The PIP Framework 
is not a formal treaty, but it does introduce an innovative 
method of governance through enforceable contracts. 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Tobacco kills around 6 million people every year, with 
80% of smokers living in low-income and middle-
income countries.3 The FCTC—adopted in 2003 and 
enforced in 2005—has 180 Parties (179 states and the 
European Union).4 Highly populated countries such as 
Indonesia and the USA, however, have not ratified. The 
FCTC, comprising economic demand and supply 
reduction strategies, acts as the legal rubric for tobacco 
control, designed to “protect present and future 
generations from the devastating social, environmental 
and economic consequences of tobacco”.5
Social mobilisation has propelled FCTC implementation 
and its continued normative work. The Framework 
Convention Alliance (FCA), a network of civil society and 
professional associations, advocates for and provides 
technical assistance on tobacco regulation and litigation. 
The coalition mobilises political will through powerful 
and blunt messaging, such as its so-called death clock— 
a running tally of tobacco-related deaths. The FCA 
provides country needs assessments and reports on 
implementation of the FCTC.
The Conference of the Parties (COP), the FCTC’s 
governing body, issues legally persuasive guidelines 
and decisions to interpret and implement the treaty. 
The COP is also empowered to create legally binding 
protocols. The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in 
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Panel 1: Typology of WHO legal instruments
Conventions, agreements
•	 Constitutional	authority:	Article	19	empowers	the	World	Health	Assembly	to	“adopt	
conventions or agreements” by a two-thirds vote; Article 20 directs member states to 
affirmatively	“take	action”	by	accepting	or	rejecting	the	convention	or	agreement	
within 18 months
•	 Force	of	law:	legally	binding
•	 Scope:	any	matter	within	WHO’s	competence
•	 Illustration:	Framework	Convention	on	Tobacco	Control
Regulations
•	 Constitutional	authority:	Article	21	empowers	the	World	Health	Assembly	to	adopt	
regulations; Article 22 specifies that regulations automatically enter into force for all 
member states, except for those that proactively notify the WHO Director-General of 
rejection	or	reservations	within	the	specified	timeframe
•	 Force	of	law:	legally	binding
•	 Scope:	specific	topics,	such	as	preventing	international	spread	of	disease,	causes	and	
nomenclatures of disease, public health practice, and pharmaceutical labelling and 
standards
•	 Illustration:	International	Health	Regulations	(2005),	International	Classification	of	
Diseases	and	Related	Health	Problems	(1990)
Recommendations
•	 Constitutional	authority:	Article	23	empowers	the	World	Health	Assembly	to	make	
recommendations to member states 
•	 Force	of	law:	non-binding	but	persuasive
•	 Topic:	any	matter	within	WHO’s	competence
•	 Illustrations:	Pandemic	Influenza	Preparedness	Framework,	International	Code	of	
Marketing	of	Breast-Milk	Substitutes	(1981),	and	Global	Code	of	Practice	on	
International Recruitment of Health Personnel (2010)
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Tobacco Products, the only existing Protocol, aims to 
reduce unlawful import and sale of tobacco products. 
However, 15 additional Parties must ratify before the 
Protocol can be enforced.6
Systemic deficiencies
Compliance and enforcement
State sovereignty presents a challenge to treaty compliance, 
as does aggressive lobbying by the tobacco industry against 
FCTC standards. The FCTC requires Parties to periodically 
report on implementation, but governments are not always 
forthright. Civil society shadow reports highlight 
deficiencies, but the COP cannot force governments to 
fulfil their obligations. FCTC dispute settlement, moreover, 
is voluntary and only possible between Parties. The COP 
cannot make a formal complaint if a state violates the 
Convention. COP7 (Delhi, India; November, 2016) called 
for knowledge hubs, toolkits, and strategic frameworks on 
sustainable measures to strengthen implementation.7–9 
The FCTC could be bolstered by built-in compliance 
mechanisms. The World Trade Organization (WTO), for 
example, has a robust dispute settlement adjudication 
process, and arms control treaties often require verification 
of compliance.
Novel technologies
As tobacco companies diversify into novel nicotine delivery 
devices, regulatory responses have lagged. Although 
companies claim, for example, that electronic cigarettes 
reduce harm, they aggressively market to adolescents using 
familiar strategies (cartoons, video games, and candy 
flavouring).10 The FCTC targets traditional tobacco 
products, but it has struggled to regulate novel technologies. 
This contributes to governments’ continued divergent 
approaches to electronic cigarettes, ranging from outright 
bans and regulation (as prescribed smoking cessation 
products) to no regulation.
The FCTC should harness new technologies to monitor 
treaty implementation, particularly for the illicit trade 
Protocol. Tracking import and sale of unlawful tobacco 
products is complex and expensive, and beyond the 
capacity of governments in low-income countries. 
Tobacco companies capitalise on poor tobacco surveillance 
by offering partnership programmes. The COP has urged 
Parties to support Protocol implementation, but it cannot 
require them to provide financial or technical assistance.11
International tobacco litigation
The tobacco industry has aggressively litigated against 
tobacco control laws, bringing cases before domestic 
courts, the WTO, and under international investment 
treaties. International litigation has targeted states with 
innovative laws such as plain packaging, graphic images, 
and single presentation limits (only one tobacco product 
per brand name). Low-income states are wary to assume 
the economic and political costs incurred in defending 
Figure: Key normative global health events 
PHEIC=public health emergencies of international concern.
1890s
• 1892: adoption of the International 
Sanitary Convention (predecessor to 
the International Health Regulations)
• 1893: adoption of the International List 
of Causes of Death (predecessor to the 
International Classiﬁcation of Diseases)
2000–05
• 2000: adoption by the UN of the Millennium Declaration 
and Millennium Development Goals
• 2001: adoption by the UN of the Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS
• 2003: adoption by WHO of the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control
• 2003: launch by WHO of the 3 by 5 Initiative (HIV 
treatment for 3 million patients by 2005)
• 2004: adoption by WHO of the Global Strategy on Diet, 
Physical Activity, and Health 
• 2005: adoption by WHO of the Revised International 
Health Regulations 
2011–16
• 2011: launch by WHO of the Pandemic Inﬂuenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework
• 2011: adoption by the UN of the Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting 
of the General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases
• 2012: adoption by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control COP of the Protocol 
to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products
• 2013: adoption by WHO of the Comprehensive Mental Health Action Plan 
• 2013: adoption by WHO of the Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases (2013–20)
• 2014: PHEIC Declaration by WHO Director-General for wild poliovirus
• 2014: PHEIC Declaration by WHO Director-General for Ebola virus disease outbreak 
in west Africa
• 2015: adoption by the UN of the Sustainable Development Goals
• 2016: PHEIC Declaration by WHO Director-General for Zika virus and complications
• 2016: scheduled review of the PIP Framework
20th century
• 1948: adoption by WHO of Nomenclature with Respect to Diseases and Causes of Death
• 1951: adoption by WHO of the International Sanitary Regulations (predecessor to the 
International Health Regulations)
• 1955: launch by WHO of the global programme to eradicate malaria
• 1959: launch by WHO of the global programme to eradicate smallpox
• 1978: adoption by WHO of the Declaration of Alma-Ata (Health for All) by the International 
Conference on Primary Health Care
• 1981: adoption by WHO of the International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes
• 1988: launch by WHO of the global programme to eradicate polio
2006–10
• 2006: launch by WHO of the Global Action Plan 
for Inﬂuenza Vaccines
• 2008: adoption by WHO of the Action Plan for the 
Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases (2008–13)
• 2009: PHEIC Declaration by WHO Director-General 
for pandemic inﬂuenza (H1N1)  
• 2010: adoption by WHO of the Global Code of Practice 
on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel
• 2010: adoption by WHO of the Global Strategy to 
Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 20201890
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lawsuits. Panel 2 describes legal challenges to tobacco 
control laws in Australia, Norway, and Uruguay, while 
table 1 summarises national and international litigation. 
Essential reforms
Using a bottom-up strategy to spur compliance is essential 
for treaty implementation. Civil society organisations 
should be funded and empowered to submit shadow 
reports while pressuring governments to adopt FCTC 
norms. The COP should issue strong guidelines for FCTC 
implementation while publicly confronting industry front 
groups and evaluating governments’ treaty performance. 
The COP, for example, could create a standing technical 
committee to propose regulations for novel technologies, 
complementing the WHO Study Group on Tobacco 
Product Regulation.16 Sustainable funding is also essential. 
The COP transformed the FCTC’s voluntary assessed 
contributions into mandatory contributions at the most 
recent meeting in November, 2016, and continues to 
encourage states and philanthropic organisations to 
increase extra-budgetary funding and pursue revenue-
generating strategies.17,18
WHO should assertively defend States Parties in 
trade and investment disputes. WHO and the FCTC 
Secretariat, for example, filed authoritative amicus briefs 
in Philip Morris versus Uruguay. WHO should be more 
proactive in influencing WTO policy and decision 
making, prioritising public health over trade. The COP 
asked the FCTC Secretariat to be proactive in applying 
for WTO observer status.19 Legal regimes must defer to 
FCTC public health norms, setting a precedent for future 
multisector public health action in settings such as 
nutrition, alcoholic beverages, and mental health.
International Health Regulations (2005)
The origins of the IHR can be traced to European sanitary 
conferences held from 1851 to 1926. WHO adopted the 
International Sanitary Regulations in 1948, using its 
extraordinary powers to make the regulations binding on 
all member states unless they affirmatively opt out 
(Articles 21, 22; panel 1). The World Health Assembly 
amended the sanitary regulations several times, renaming 
the treaty the IHR in 1969. In the aftermath of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and recognising the 
need to govern emerging infectious diseases, WHO 
adopted fundamentally revised regulations in 2005.
The 2005 revision ushered in transformational reforms, 
including an all-hazards strategy, early state reporting, 
use of unofficial (non-state) data sources, and building 
health-system capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to 
potential public health emergencies of international 
concern (PHEIC). The IHR empower WHO to coordinate 
stakeholders and make recommendations while balancing 
health with trade and human rights. The 2005 reform 
proved prescient, with the Director-General subsequently 
declaring four PHEICs: influenza (H1N1) in 2009, polio in 
2014, Ebola virus in 2014, and Zika virus (together with 
associated neurological conditions) in 2016. The Director-
General also assembled IHR Emergency Committees for 
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) and yellow 
fever without declaring a PHEIC, although WHO 
Panel 2: International tobacco control litigation
Norway: display ban
In	2009,	Norway	prohibited	the	display	of	tobacco	products	in	any	stores	other	than	
tobacconists	(termed	the	display	ban).	The	display	ban	prohibited	display	of	any	tobacco	
products	or	vending	machine	tokens;	stores	could	present	only	a	list	of	products	and	
prices in neutral typography and layout. Advertising (eg, with brands, logos, and images) 
was	prohibited.	Similar	bans	were	enacted	in	Iceland,	Ireland,	Finland,	Panama,	
New Zealand, and the UK. Philip Morris challenged Norway’s display ban, claiming it 
unlawfully restricted free trade under the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement.
The	Court	of	Justice	for	the	European	Free	Trade	Association	States	issued	an	advisory	
opinion finding that the display ban was a quantitative import restriction, but left it to the 
national	court	to	decide	whether	the	public	health	objective	could	be	achieved	by	less	
restrictive measures. In September, 2012, the District Court of Oslo upheld the display ban, 
concluding that it was a suitable and necessary measure to ensure public health protection. It 
said	the	absence	of	visible	tobacco	products	in	shops	is	essential	to	denormalise	tobacco.	The	
Court	ordered	Philip	Morris	to	pay	1·36	million	Norwegian	kroner	to	cover	litigation	costs.
Uruguay: single presentation
In	2008–09,	Uruguay	implemented	a	single	presentation	requirement	precluding	tobacco	
manufacturers	from	marketing	more	than	one	variant	of	cigarette	per	brand	family.	
Based	on	this	requirement,	Philip	Morris	could	not	market	Marlboro	Red,	Marlboro	Gold,	
Marlboro	Blue,	and	Marlboro	Green,	but	could	market	only	one	label.	Uruguay	also	
required	graphic	warning	labels	covering	80%	of	the	front	and	back	of	cigarette	packages,	
leaving	only	20%	for	trademarks	and	logos.	In	2010,	Philip	Morris	requested	arbitration	at	
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), asserting that 
Uruguay had violated the bilateral investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay.
In July, 2016, the international trade arbitration panel upheld Uruguay’s tobacco control 
measures as a valid exercise of the state’s police powers, stressing that Uruguay had 
fulfilled	the	obligations	of	the	Framework	Convention	on	Tobacco	Control	(FCTC).12	The	
panel	noted	that	the	FCTC	is	an	evidence-based	treaty	guaranteeing	the	right	to	health.	
The	arbitration	panel	also	ruled	that	the	regulations	were	not	a	direct	or	indirect	
expropriation	of	Philip	Morris’s	intellectual	property.	The	panel	ordered	Philip	Morris	to	
compensate Uruguay US$7 million for litigation expenses.
Australia: plain packaging
Australia	was	the	first	country	to	adopt	plain	packaging	in	2011,	whereby	tobacco	must	
be	sold	in	a	uniform,	drab,	olive-brown	package	with	graphic	images.	The	legislation	was	
designed	to	avoid	misleading	consumers	about	the	devastating	effects	of	smoking.13 
Since	then,	Canada,	Chile,	France,	South	Africa,	and	the	UK	have	introduced	similar	laws.
Seeking	to	deter	adoption	of	plain	packaging	in	other	countries,	tobacco	manufacturers	and	
countries friendly to the industry brought domestic and international litigation against 
Australia, including an investor-state dispute arbitration conducted under the United 
Nations	Commission	on	International	Trade	Law	(UNCITRAL)	and	dispute	settlement	
proceedings	in	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO).	In	December,	2015,	UNCITRAL	ruled in 
favour	of	Australia	on	a	procedural	claim,	saying	the	industry	had	“abused”	the	arbitration	
process.14	Reports	indicate	that	the	interim	report	of	the	WTO	panel	has	found	Australia’s	
plain	packaging	measures	to	be	a	legitimate	public	health	measure.	The	Dominican	
Republic,	Cuba,	Indonesia,	and	Honduras	are	challenging	Australia’s	plain	packaging	as	a	
violation of trade and intellectual property. As the various cases proceed, Australia’s 
litigation	costs	keep	rising,	and	are	estimated	to	exceed	AUS$50	million.15
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continues to monitor both closely. Currently, the 
organisation is on high alert because of circulating avian 
influenza viruses. Yet, the gap between the instrument’s 
norms and its real-world impact is cavernous, as the Ebola 
virus disease epidemic revealed.20
Systemic deficiencies
The effectiveness of the IHR has suffered from states’ 
non-compliance and WHO’s inability to coordinate 
stakeholders and respond decisively. The major test of an 
instrument’s effectiveness is stakeholder compliance, 
but WHO has few enforcement tools, failing to hold 
states accountable for weak IHR core capacities or 
counterproductive travel and trade restrictions.
Capacity building
National capacities to detect, report, and respond are the 
foundation for preparedness. Yet, WHO has routinely 
allowed states to delay fulfilling their responsibilities. 
Only 30% of States Parties report meeting core 
capacities.21 The non-compliance rate is probably higher 
because states evaluate themselves. Governments have 
few geopolitical incentives to build core capacities, and 
many have not devoted the necessary resources.
WHO recommendations
The IHR empower the Director-General to make 
recommendations on the basis of the advice of the 
emergency committee. Yet, when outbreaks arise, 
public fears can fuel over-reactions, such as scientifically 
unwarranted quarantines and travel or trade 
restrictions. Governments and private actors often 
disregard WHO guidance.22 In turn, states wary of 
economic repercussions might hesitate to report 
unusual findings. Dispute resolution is available only if 
Parties consent.
Flexibility and politics
Declaration of a PHEIC can be subject to political 
influence because of a country’s concerns about reduced 
tourism and trade. The Director-General has been 
inconsistent in deciding whether, and when, to declare a 
PHEIC. After criticism for overreacting to H1N1, the 
Director-General delayed for months before declaring 
Ebola a PHEIC. The Director-General promptly declared 
a PHEIC for Zika virus and associated neurological 
deficits, but ended the PHEIC declaration even as the 
trajectory of the outbreak remained uncertain. The 
Director-General further declared an emergency for 
sporadic wild-type poliovirus cases, but has thus far 
refrained from declaring a PHEIC for MERS and yellow 
fever. The reasoning and evidence for convening 
emergency committees, declaring a PHEIC, and ending 
the emergency have often been opaque.
A more flexible governance structure could enable 
WHO to mount earlier, event-specific responses. Global 
commissions in the wake of the Ebola virus disease 
epidemic proposed an intermediate-level emergency 
declaration or a standing emergency com mittee, or a 
combination of both, to continuously monitor circulating 
pathogens of concern.20 Enhancing transparency and 
accountability would improve international confidence.23
United Kingdom European Union India Uruguay Australia
Outcome Victory Victory Victory Victory Victory*
Date May, 2016 May, 2016 May, 2016 July, 2016 2017 
Venue UK High Court European Court of Justice Supreme Court of India ICSID	International	Trade	
Arbitration
WTO
Challenged 
control 
measure
Plain	packaging Graphic warning labels; banning 
tobacco	flavours;	regulations	for	
electronic cigarettes
Warning label size Warning label size and single 
brand presentation
Plain	packaging
Key points The	FCTC	has	a	high	status	in	EU	
law;	guidelines	to	the	FCTC	have	
particularly high evidential value; the 
FCTC	and	the	WTO’s	TRIPS	
Agreement can be read together 
without	any	risk	of	them	colliding	or	
being inconsistent; both prevalence 
and consumption data supported 
the	effectiveness	of	plain	packaging	
measures; there is nothing in the 
ordinary principles of international 
law that would require a court to 
hold	that	TRIPS	takes	precedence	
over	the	FCTC
The	EU	directive	seeks	to	meet	the	
obligations of the European Union under 
the	FCTC;	EU	member	states	might	
maintain or introduce additional 
requirements	regarding	packaging	of	
tobacco products that go beyond the 
requirements of the EU directive; it is 
lawful	for	EU	legislature,	taking	account	
of	FCTC	guidelines,	to	impose	a	
prohibition	on	all	characterising	flavours;	
the EU acted in accordance with COP 
decision that urged Parties to consider 
banning or restricting advertising, 
promotion, and sponsorship of electronic 
cigarettes
India’s warning labels are 
among the world’s most 
stringent, covering 85% of 
the	front	and	back	of	
cigarette	packs;	India’s	
Government will proceed 
with implementation of 
the regulations and 
opposes any further delay 
in their implementation
Nowhere	does	the	TRIPS	
Agreement provide for a right to 
use	a	trademark;	in	the	Tribunal’s	
view, adoption of the challenged 
measures by Uruguay was a valid 
exercise of its police powers to 
protect public health; the 
challenged measures were 
adopted in fulfilment of 
Uruguay’s national and 
international legal obligations for 
protection of public health
Ukraine	withdrew	from	the	
dispute settlement proceedings; 
the Dominican Republic, Cuba, 
Indonesia, and Honduras 
challenged Australia’s plain 
packaging	measures;	the	dispute	
settlement panel advised the 
parties that it now expects to 
issue its final report in July, 2017; 
the interim report validated 
Australia’s	plain	packaging	as	a	
legitimate public health measure
ICSID=International	Centre	for	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes.	WTO=World	Trade	Organization.	FCTC=Framework	Convention	on	Tobacco	Control.	TRIPS=Trade-Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights.	
COP=Conference of the Parties. *As per interim report.
Table 1: National and international tobacco litigation
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One Health
The IHR encompass zoonotic diseases but do not 
address the integral connections between the health of 
people, animals, and the environment. WHO, together 
with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), 
has built an operational framework, but the One Health 
concept is not embodied in the text of the IHR.24 WHO 
should consider expanding the text of the regulations 
and partner with complementary organisations.
Sharing benefits and burdens
Global health security requires cooperative sharing of 
biological samples to facilitate research while ensuring 
fair distribution of benefits. Yet, there is no global 
agreement on data sharing and reciprocal benefits outside 
pandemic influenza. Linking the IHR and PIP Framework 
(as discussed below) would enhance international 
preparedness. Failure to deal with inequities in access to 
essential vaccines and pharmaceuticals will undermine 
global cooperation, thus undermining security for all.
Sustainable financing
The IHR encourage states to provide technical and 
financial assistance, but sustainable financing has 
lagged. WHO’s emergency operations are also under-
financed. The organisation has raised barely half the 
budget for its core emergency capacity and response 
plan, and only a third for the US$100 million Contingency 
Fund for Emergencies.25,26 The Global Health Security 
Agenda (GHSA) provided $1 billion towards building 
and evaluating core capacities, but it operates outside 
WHO. Moreover, the USA might not reauthorise GHSA 
funding.
Essential reforms
The focal problems of the IHR are caused primarily 
by poor implementation and enforcement rather than 
by textual deficiencies.27 Crucial reforms include 
rigorous matrices, independent evaluations, trans-
parency, accountability, and funding.
In 2016, WHO announced a new framework to monitor 
IHR core capacities: a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) 
tool.28 The JEE, which integrates GHSA matrices, relies 
on independent experts working alongside national 
health officials, with outcomes made fully transparent.29 
Governments are then expected to develop country-
specific action plans. JEE is voluntary, but over 65 states 
have either completed or are planning to complete 
evaluations.25 There is a 5-year interval between the 
evaluations, which is too long given the need for up-to-
date capacities. WHO also encourages states to do in-
country simulations.
Rigorous JEEs require trained evaluators working over 
a multi-year period. Yet, WHO has been unable to finance 
these operations. Furthermore, the GHSA is due to end 
in 2019, with no assurance of congressional 
reauthorisation. Finland leads the Alliance for Country 
Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR 
Implementation, a public–private partnership formed to 
provide both financial and technical assistance. Yet, 
available resources are unlikely to fill the substantial 
funding gaps.
International donors also have not supported health 
systems, while member states have resisted the 
increased assessed contributions. The World Bank’s 
Pandemic Emergency Facility (PEF) could condition 
grants on the basis of completion of the JEE process, 
but the PEF itself is narrowly focused and under-
funded.30 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
should consider including national preparedness in its 
macroeconomic assessments; countries pay close 
attention to IMF assessments because it expands their 
access to capital.31
Finally, the IHR are not well understood outside 
health ministries, and governments have not integrated 
IHR capacities into universal health coverage. 
Consequently, the IHR and Sustainable Development 
Goals operate in silos. The IHR might never reach their 
full potential unless political leaders prioritise funding 
and empower WHO.
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
The PIP Framework might be the most novel WHO legal 
instrument, recognising the global value of equal footing 
between sharing of influenza viruses and access to 
benefits. The Framework, adopted in 2011, creatively 
covers industry and civil society, as well as States Parties. 
It uses contract law to enforce its norms. Although not a 
treaty, the Framework has features of international law: 
shared responsibilities, stakeholder cooperation, and 
compliance mechanisms.
The withholding of H5N1 influenza samples from the 
WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response 
System (GISRS; then called the Global Influenza 
Surveillance Network) in 2007 provided the impetus for 
the PIP Framework.32 Countries asserted sovereignty 
over the virus, arguing that the global virus-sharing 
regime was inherently unjust; governments were 
expected to share biological materials but could not 
afford the medical products developed from those 
samples.
The PIP Framework has two key elements: non-
binding norms and legally binding contracts. Contracts, 
known as standard material transfer agreements 
(SMTAs), broaden the range of actors that are 
traditionally the subject of international law. SMTAs 
bind pharmaceutical companies, diagnostic companies, 
and academic institutions that are economic 
beneficiaries of virus sharing. The PIP Framework 
shows how international rule-making can evolve to 
guide the conduct of non-state actors.
From a social justice perspective, the Framework 
balances obligation–benefit relationships among parties, 
designed to spur research while promoting equitable 
For	more	on	the	Global Health 
Security Agenda see 
https://ghsagenda.org
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access to supplies and vaccines during pandemics. 
Benefits include specific monetary and in-kind 
commitments, such as donating vaccines to WHO 
stockpiles, offering products at affordable prices, or 
granting royalty-free licenses (table 2).
The PIP Framework has introduced another major 
innovation: GISRS users must make partnership 
contributions in addition to benefits negotiated in SMTAs. 
These contributions support preparedness and response 
while sustaining the GISRS. As of Jan 31, 2017, 
contributions reached $117·8 million,33 with approximately 
70% supporting laboratory and surveillance, 10% going 
towards disease burden studies, and 20% to prepare for 
pandemic preparedness.34 The PIP Framework underwent 
a scheduled review, with its report presented to the 
Executive Board in January, 2017.35
Systemic deficiencies
The PIP Framework delivers tangible benefits, with 
accountability, but it has a narrow scope and limited 
funding while failing to adapt to new technologies.
Narrow scope
The PIP Framework covers only influenza viruses with 
human pandemic potential, not even seasonal influenza. 
Monitoring of seasonal influenza viruses is essential for 
rapid detection of influenza strains. The PIP Framework 
review recommended that WHO study the impact of 
including seasonal influenza in the Framework. 
Researchers cannot readily identify genetic shifts or 
novel viruses without continuous monitoring of 
circulating seasonal viruses. More importantly, the PIP 
Framework does not apply to non-influenza pathogens, 
including circulating viruses (eg, MERS, Ebola virus, 
Zika virus, and yellow fever). The review group 
recommended that the PIP Framework serve as a 
“foundational model of reciprocity for global public 
health that could be applied to other pathogens”.35 An 
international agreement on benefit sharing for major 
circulating pathogens would improve emergency 
preparedness.
Funding
The Global Action Plan for Influenza Vaccines (GAP), 
launched in 2006 as a 10-year initiative with a broader 
mandate encompassing seasonal and pandemic 
influenza, concluded in 2016. GAP supported capacity 
enhancement and technology transfer to develop 
vaccine-manufacturing capabilities in lower-income 
countries. With the end of GAP, there will be added 
pressure on partnership contributions to sustain 
capacity development.36 Moreover, the financing shortfall 
in WHO’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies 
underscores the need for sustainable financing that an 
expanded PIP Framework, and accompanying 
partnership contributions, could provide.26 The review 
group recommended increasing partnership 
contributions to match the increased operating costs of 
the GISRS system.37
Technological advances
Genetic sequence data pose a major security risk, 
enabling scientists to recreate viruses and enhance their 
functions. If the private sector had open access to genetic 
SMTA benefit commitments Approximate 2015 
partnership contribution 
range (US$)
SMTA2 examples
Group A: vaccine and antiviral 
manufacturers
Donate at least 10% of real-time pandemic vaccine production to WHO; reserve at least 
10% of real-time pandemic vaccine production at affordable prices to WHO; donate at least 
[X] treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandemic to WHO; reserve at 
least [X] treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandemic at affordable 
prices; grant fair and reasonable licenses to manufacturers in developing countries, 
including in respect of affordable royalties; grant royalty-free licenses to manufacturers in 
developing countries or grant royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses to WHO that can be 
sublicensed (WHO might sublicense these licenses in accordance with sound public health 
principles)
$2638	to	$7	123	339	
(based on average annual 
influenza	product	sales)
China National Biotech Group; 
Sanofi Pasteur; Glaxo Group 
Limited; Serum Institute of India; 
MedImmune
Group B: manufacturers of 
products relevant to pandemic 
influenza	preparedness	and	
response (eg, diagnostic test 
manufacturers)
Donate	to	WHO	at	least	[X]	diagnostic	kits	needed	for	pandemics;	reserve	for	WHO	at	least	
[X]	diagnostic	kits	needed	for	pandemics,	at	affordable	prices;	support,	in	coordination	
with	WHO,	strengthening	of	influenza-specific	laboratory	and	surveillance	capacity	in	
developing countries; support, in coordination with WHO, transfer of technology, 
know-how,	and	processes	for	pandemic	influenza	preparedness	and	response	in	
developing countries
$2638 to $448 507 (based 
on average annual 
influenza	product	sales)
Quidel Corporation
Group C: other recipients of 
pandemic	influenza	biological	
materials outside of GISRS 
(eg, research or academic 
institutions)
Donations of vaccines; donations of pre-pandemic vaccines; donations of antiviral drugs; 
donations	of	medical	devices;	donations	of	diagnostic	kits;	affordable	pricing;	transfer	of	
technology and processes; granting of sublicenses to WHO; laboratory and surveillance 
capacity building
Contributions made by 
influenza	vaccine,	
diagnostic, and 
pharmaceutical 
manufacturers through the 
GISRS
Baylor College of Medicine; Shiga 
University of Medical Science; 
University of Bergen; National 
Research Centre, Egypt; National 
Veterinary Research Institute, 
Nigeria
SMTA=Standard	Material	Transfer	Agreement.	GISRS=Global	Influenza	Surveillance	and	Response	System.	[X]=number	of	doses	or	treatment	courses.
Table 2: Benefit-sharing features of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
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sequence data, it might have little incentive to offer 
benefits.38 The PIP Framework’s application to genetic 
sequence data, however, remains unclear.39 The review 
group recommended amending the Framework’s 
definition of PIP biological materials to include genetic 
sequence data.36 This would require political buy-in by 
member states and non-state actors. However, during the 
January, 2017, Executive Board meeting, the USA 
opposed inclusion of genetic sequence data in the 
definition of PIP biological materials.
Additionally, if a universal influenza vaccine were 
developed, the PIP Framework’s utility could be 
undermined. Currently, a seasonal influenza booster is 
required annually to confer immunity. If a universal 
vaccine covered both seasonal and pandemic influenza 
viruses, the need to share viruses through GISRS would 
be diminished; one foot of the equal footing relationship 
would no longer be present and there would be 
diminished incentives for benefit sharing.
Legal barriers
The PIP Framework’s novel features can be burdensome. 
The transaction time to complete contract negotiations is 
considerable, especially with a leanly staffed secretariat. 
To date, ten manufacturers and more than 50 academic 
institutions have entered into SMTA2 contracts.40 
However, some manufacturers are reluctant to negotiate 
SMTAs or offer benefit-sharing commitments.36
Moreover, competing international agreements 
compromise the PIP Framework. The Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity41 
establishes access and benefit sharing for the transfer 
of genetic resources. The Nagoya Protocol is interpreted 
as giving States Parties sovereign rights over viruses 
discovered in their territories, even if legal experts 
suggest that governments cannot own a virus.42 The 
mandates of the Nagoya Protocol and the PIP 
Framework overlap, even conflict, on the duty to share 
pathogens. Compared with the Nagoya Protocol, which 
is a binding treaty, the PIP Framework’s non-binding 
nature threatens its international legal standing.43 
WHO is in consultations with the Convention on 
Biological Diversity secretariat, but future rules 
on sharing pathogenic biological materials remain 
in flux.44
Luck
The world, fortunately, has been unable to assess the 
Framework’s true power in the absence of pandemic 
influenza. If a pandemic emerged, would states and 
stake holders abide by their commitments or would 
electorates steer them toward self-protection? WHO 
might not have the political influence to enforce 
contractually agreed benefit contributions during 
health crises.
Essential reforms
The World Health Assembly should incorporate genetic 
sequence data into the PIP Framework, empowering 
the secretariat to work with industry partners to develop 
technology to monitor genetic sequence data sharing. 
However, the movement towards open access to 
research data poses a challenge, because widespread 
dissemination of genetic sequence data can pose a 
bioterrorism threat and diminish funding incentives 
from private industry.
While acknowledging the epidemiological uniqueness 
of the influenza viruses, incorporation of non-influenza 
pathogens into the PIP Framework would enhance 
health security. A United Nations High Level Panel 
recommended that WHO renegotiate the Framework to 
include other novel pathogens, while also making it 
legally binding.45 Expansion of the Framework would 
support new public–private partnerships, including the 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), 
to outsmart epidemics. The World Health Assembly 
should incorporate seasonal influenza into the 
Framework and negotiate a new legal instrument for 
other novel pathogens.
The Assembly should also increase partnership 
contributions, especially with the end of the GAP. At 
present, partnership contributions cover only 50% of the 
2010 GISRS running costs. Furthermore, industry 
leaders should be held accountable for entering into 
SMTAs and accompanying partnership contributions. To 
encourage compliance and avoid free-riding, the PIP 
secretariat, minimally, should publicly identify 
uncooperative contracting parties. Finally, the secretariat 
should be empowered to enforce SMTAs by, for example, 
blocking delivery of virus samples.
Lessons for development of WHO norms
The global health law trilogy, despite its weaknesses, offers 
proof that global health law can be a powerful tool. The 
new WHO Director-General should push for novel global 
health laws on major health hazards (eg, non-
communicable diseases, mental health, and injuries) and 
new initiatives (eg, universal health coverage). The lessons 
learned from 21st century international health law are that 
broad scope, robust compliance, inclusion of public and 
private actors, and sustainable financing are essential to 
success. Legal instruments must also be flexible, with the 
capacity to evolve with time, technological advancement, 
and scientific evidence. In an age of nationalistic populism, 
collective action remains crucial to ameliorate globalised 
health threats, helping to realise the right to health.
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